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Abstract
I discuss a game-theoretic model in which scientists compete to finish the
intermediate stages of some research project. Banerjee et al. (2014) have previ-
ously shown that if the credit awarded for intermediate results is proportional
to their difficulty, then the strategy profile in which scientists share each inter-
mediate stage as soon as they complete it is a Nash equilibrium. I show that
the equilibrium is both unique and strict. Thus rational credit-maximizing
scientists have an incentive to share their intermediate results, as long as this
is sufficiently rewarded.
1 Introduction
This technical report provides proofs for the mathematical theorems mentioned in
my article “Communism and the Incentive to Share in Science”. I begin by briefly
motivating the game-theoretical model and the questions it aims to address.
As mentioned in the article, Strevens (2017) gives a “Hobbesian vindication” of
the communist norm, the social norm in science that mandates scientists to share
their research findings widely. There is need for a Hobbesian vindication, according
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to Strevens, because scientists would not be inclined to share their findings in the
absence of the communist norm. In particular, because getting rewarded for scientific
achievements depends upon publications, there is “a powerful incentive not to share
your results before you have extracted every last publication from them” (Strevens
2017). Other authors have also claimed the existence of such a tension between the
norm of sharing and the desire to receive credit for one’s work (e.g., Dasgupta and
David 1994, Arzberger et al. 2004, Resnik 2006, Borgman 2012, Soranno et al. 2015).
In contrast, two recent papers have used game-theoretic models to suggest that
sharing may be individually incentivized despite the potential for future discoveries,
as long as partial or intermediate discoveries are rewarded with credit roughly
proportional to their difficulty (Boyer 2014, Banerjee et al. 2014). This is directly
contrary to the view argued in the quotes above if one thinks that the real reward
structure of science awards credit proportional to difficulty; if one thinks that this is
not the case these papers may be viewed as providing a policy recommendation for
how to incentivize sharing.
Boyer (2014) studies a model which is, by his own admission, highly idealized.
Hence it cannot by itself support general claims about the incentives faced by scientists
regarding intermediate results sharing. Banerjee et al. (2014) address this worry by
providing a model that relaxes Boyer’s assumptions that there are only two scientists,
that the scientists are equally productive, that different intermediate results are
equally hard to achieve, that intermediate results can only be achieved in one order,
and that scientists share either all or no intermediate results (note that while I cast
them as addressing a worry about Boyer, to my knowledge Banerjee et al. were not
aware of Boyer’s work, and vice versa).
Banerjee et al. (2014) show that sharing is a Nash equilibrium in their model
if sufficient credit is given for intermediate results. They do not show that the
equilibrium is unique, except in a special case with Stackelberg agents, where a
significant proportion of the scientists commits to sharing in advance.
This leaves us with a potential equilibrium selection problem. Since there may be
other Nash equilibria, it is unclear whether or under what circumstances rational
credit-maximizing scientists can be expected to share.
This paper addresses this issue by showing that in many cases no equilibrium
selection problem exists: under slightly strengthened assumptions the equilibrium
identified by Banerjee et al. is unique. I also show that the equilibrium is strict, and
that the game is a weakly better reply game in the sense of Huttegger (2013). The
significance of the latter result is that boundedly rational scientists are likely to find
the equilibrium.
Section 2 describes Banerjee et al.’s model, which I call the Intermediate Results
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Game. In section 3 I suggest a distinction between a version of the Intermediate Results
Game with perfect information (scientists know when other scientists have completed
but not published intermediate results) and one with imperfect information. I show
that the sharing equilibrium is the backwards induction solution of the Intermediate
Results Game with perfect information and that other equilibria of the Game differ
from the backwards induction solution only off the equilibrium path.
Section 4 shows that sharing is the unique and strict equilibrium of the Intermediate
Results Game with imperfect information. Section 5 extends the results of sections
3 and 4 to the case of a directed acyclic network determining the order in which
intermediate results can be completed (as opposed to a single sequence), again under
slightly strengthened assumptions compared to those for which Banerjee et al. show
the existence of the sharing equilibrium.
Section 6 shows that the Intermediate Results Game with imperfect information
of sections 4 and 5 is a weakly better reply game. Section 7 shows that the results of
the preceding sections also hold in a version of the Game in which credit is measured
per unit of time. Two appendices provide the proofs.
2 The Intermediate Results Game
Consider a research project that can be divided into k ≥ 1 intermediate stages. The
stages can only be completed sequentially: stages 1 through j − 1 must be completed
before work on stage j can be started (this assumption will be relaxed in section 5).
There are n ≥ 2 scientists (or research groups) working on the research project.
Their productivity is modeled by (nonstationary) Poisson processes. Poisson processes
are used to model the occurrence of events at random intervals. Here, the occurrence
of an event is interpreted as some scientist successfully completing an intermediate
stage. John C. Huber has shown in a series of papers that scientists’ productivity is
accurately modeled by a Poisson process (Huber 1998a,b, Huber and Wagner-Döbler
2001a,b, Huber 2001).
Each scientist i has a productivity rate λij > 0 while working on stage j. This
captures the speed at which she works: working at rate λij, she would expect to
complete λij stages per unit of time. The expected time to complete stage j is 1/λij.
Since productivity may vary by scientist and by stage, the Intermediate Results
Game allows for differences in inherent difficulty between stages, differences in inherent
aptitude between scientists, as well as differences in specialization among scientists
(making some stages easier and some harder for different scientists, although the
extent to which scientists may have different specializations is restricted by the
assumption of Proportional Credit to be introduced below).
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Define σj1···jn to be the total productivity of the scientists when scientist i is
working on stage ji. I use σj as shorthand for the total productivity in the important
special case in which all scientists are working on stage j, i.e.,
σj1···jn =
n∑
i=1
λiji and σj =
n∑
i=1
λij.
In a Poisson process the waiting time between two events follows an exponential
distribution. What this means here is that, if Tij denotes the time it takes scientist i
to complete stage j: Pr(Tij > t) = exp{−tλij}. This distribution has some formal
features that I will use (Norris 1998, section 2.3).
First, it is memoryless. This means that if at a given time the waiting time has
not ended yet, the distribution of the remaining waiting time is equal to the original
distribution of the waiting time:
Pr(Tij > s+ t | Tij > s) = Pr(Tij > t).
Second, the minimum of n independent exponential random variables with parame-
ters λiji (i = 1, . . . , n) is itself exponentially distributed with parameter σj1···jn . In
other words, we can equivalently view the scientists’ productivity as one Poisson pro-
cess with parameter σj1···jn or n independent Poisson processes with parameters λiji .
Third, the probability that scientist i is the first one to finish the stage she is working
on is λiji/σj1···jn .
Whenever some intermediate stage j is completed, the scientist who completed
it chooses whether to share the result or not. If the scientist chooses not to share
(strategy H) she starts working on stage j + 1. Other than that nothing happens
until the next time some scientist completes a stage.
If the scientist chooses to share (strategy E) she gets cj > 0 units of credit (or
utility) for the stage she just completed as well as cj′ units of credit for each stage j′
she has previously completed that had not yet been shared. All scientists who had
not yet solved stage j learn its solution. These scientists all start working on stage
j + 1.
When the final stage is completed by some scientist she automatically shares it,
gets ck units of credit for the last stage, plus cj for any stage j for which credit has not
been claimed yet, and the Game ends. The Intermediate Results Game is zero-sum:
at the end the total amount of credit divided among the scientists is C = ∑kj=1 cj.
As in any game-theoretic model, it is assumed that scientists have an interest in
maximizing their utility payoff (here, credit). What strategy or strategies maximize
utility may in general depend on the strategies chosen by other scientists, so it may
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not be obvious what a rational (credit-maximizing) scientist would do. This has
resulted in a proliferation of solution concepts for games, a number of which will
figure in subsequent sections (e.g., backwards induction, bounded rationality).
The most prominent solution concept is the (Nash) equilibrium. An equilibrium
is a strategy profile (i.e., an assignment of a strategy to each scientist) such that
no scientist can increase her expected credit by changing her strategy unilaterally
(i.e., assuming the other scientists’ strategies are unchanged). When an equilibrium
is played, each scientist is arguably acting rationally, as she cannot improve her
expected credit through her own action. Equilibrium analysis will play a central role
in subsequent sections.
3 A Backwards Induction Analysis
The previous section described a game-theoretic model of scientists working on a
project that requires some number of intermediate stages to be completed. In the
simplest version of the Intermediate Results Game there are two scientists (n = 2)
and the research project has two stages (k = 2). The extensive form of this Game is
given in figure 3.1.
At the root node (marked “N”) Nature decides which of the two scientists is
the first one to complete the first stage of the project. As indicated, Nature picks
scientist 1 with probability λ11/σ1 and scientist 2 with probability λ21/σ1 (recall that
λ11 is scientist 1’s productivity on stage 1, λ21 scientist 2’s productivity on stage 1,
and σ1 the sum of these numbers).
Suppose Nature picks scientist 1. This leads to a decision node marked “1”,
indicating that scientist 1 is the one to make a decision at this node. If scientist 1
shares the result (strategy E), she collects c1 units of credit. Both scientists now
know the solution to stage 1 of the project, so they start working on stage 2.
Nature again decides which of the two scientists completes the second stage first
(with scientist 1’s productivity now λ12, scientist 2’s λ22 and σ2 the sum). In either
case the Game ends. If Nature picks scientist 1, she gets credit for completing both
stages of the project and scientist 2 gets nothing (as indicated by the payoff pair
(C, 0) in the figure). If Nature picks scientist 2, she gets c2 units of credit, and since
scientist 1 had already claimed credit for the first stage, she ends up with c1.
What if scientist 1 chooses not to publish her solution to the first stage of the
project (strategy H at the node marked “1”)? Then scientist 1 does not collect c1
units of credit, and scientist 2 does not learn the solution to stage 1. So now scientist 1
starts working on stage 2, while scientist 2 continues to work on stage 1.
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Figure 3.1: Extensive form of the Intermediate Results Game with n = 2 and k = 2.
Once again Nature decides which of the two scientists finishes the stage she is
working on first (due to the memorylessness of the exponential distribution, scientist 2
is not more likely to finish fast despite having already spent some time working on
stage 1; cf. section 2), with scientist 1 working at rate λ12, scientist 2 working at
rate λ21, and σ21 denoting the sum of these rates. If Nature picks scientist 1, she
completes the project. The Game ends and scientist 1 gets C units of credit.
If Nature picks scientist 2, she now has a decision to make (at the node marked
“2”). She can claim c1 units of credit by playing strategy E, or defer by playing H.
In either case, both scientists can now work on stage 2.
Nature makes its final decision by picking a scientist who completes the second
stage first. That scientist gets C units of credit if scientist 2 chose strategy H, whereas
if scientist 2 chose E she gets c1 for sure and the scientist picked by Nature gets c2.
The right-hand side of the figure (associated with Nature picking scientist 2 at
the root node) works similarly.
It is implicitly assumed in figure 3.1 that scientist 1 knows when scientist 2
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completes a stage, even when she keeps the result secret. If this were not assumed, the
two decision nodes for scientist 1 would be indistinguishable to her. This is different
from Banerjee et al.’s assumption that “agents only know their own progress, and
what is shared with them by others” (Banerjee et al. 2014, 156).
This suggests subtly different versions of the Game: an Intermediate Results
Game with perfect information, in which scientists know when other scientists have
completed but not shared intermediate results, and an Intermediate Results Game
with imperfect information, in which scientists only know their own progress and
what has been publicly shared. In this section I consider the former version of the
Game, referred to as Gpn,k (with n the number of scientists and k the number of
stages, so figure 3.1 shows Gp2,2), which more realistically models scientific fields where
pre-registration of studies is common or small communities where everyone knows
what everyone is working on. The next section discusses the latter version of the
Game, referred to as Gmn,k, which more realistically models cases where it is relatively
easy to keep intermediate results secret.
If the first scientist to complete stage 1 in figure 3.1 plays H, and the other
scientist completes stage 1 before the first scientist finishes stage 2, it is rational for
the other scientist to play E: this makes it certain that she will get c1 units of credit,
without reducing either her probability of completing the second stage or her payoff
if she does so.
This is a backwards induction argument: if a certain node is reached, then it is
rational for the scientist who has to make a decision at that node to choose x; therefore,
other scientists may assume that if that node is reached, x will be played. Applying
this argument to the terminal decision nodes in figure 3.1 leads to a truncated game
tree, as shown in figure 3.2.
Here it is assumed that the second scientist to complete stage 1 always plays
strategy E. The expected payoff of that strategy for the scientist who just completed
stage 1 is a certain c1 units of credit, plus a further c2 units of credit if she is first to
complete stage 2. The payoff for the other scientist is c2 times the probability that
she is first to complete stage 2.
Now consider the decision scientist 1 has to make if she completes stage 1 first. If
she plays strategy E, her payoff is c1 for sure plus an additional c2 with probability
λ12/σ2, so her expected payoff is
c1 + c2
λ12
σ2
= c1
λ12
σ21
+ c1
λ21
σ21
+ c2
λ12
σ2
.
If she plays strategy H instead, her payoff is C with probability λ12/σ21 and c2λ12/σ2
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Figure 3.2: Truncated game tree for Gp2,2.
with probability λ21/σ21. So in this case her expected payoff is
c1
λ12
σ21
+ c2
λ12
σ21
+ c2
λ12
σ2
λ21
σ21
= c1
λ12
σ21
+ c2
λ12
σ2
+ c2
λ12
σ21
λ22
σ2
.
It follows that the expected payoff of E is at least as high as the expected payoff of
H for scientist 1 if and only if
c1
λ21
σ21
≥ c2λ12
σ21
λ22
σ2
or equivalently c1λ21
c2λ22
≥ λ12
σ2
.
Similarly, if scientist 2 completes stage 1 first, it is rational for her to play strategy E
if and only if
c1λ11
c2λ12
≥ λ22
σ2
.
In general, these inequalities need not be satisfied. For example, if the credit reward
for the two stages is equal (c1 = c2) but the second stage can be completed twice
as quickly (λ12 = 2λ11 and λ22 = 2λ21) then it is only rational to play strategy E if
the other scientist is faster at solving stage 2—the more productive scientist has an
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incentive not to share.
If the credit rewards are equal but the second stage can be completed 50 % quicker
than the first (λ12 = 32λ11 and λ22 =
3
2λ21) then the more productive scientist has an
incentive not to share if she is at least twice as productive as the other scientist. But
sharing is rational for both scientists whenever the scientists’ productivity rates are
less than a factor two different.
So whether it is rational to share may depend on the productivity rates of the
scientists. In particular, the more productive scientist has the most incentive to keep
results secret, as these examples illustrate (cf. Banerjee et al. 2014, corollary 2.2).
However, this is only worth doing if the potential gains (the chance of getting credit
for later stages) are big enough.
Note that if c1λ11 ≥ c2λ12 and c1λ21 ≥ c2λ22 the inequalities given above are
always satisfied. That is, if the credit awarded for the first stage is at least as high
as the credit given for the second stage (relative to the difficulty of the two stages),
then both scientists have an incentive to share their intermediate results, regardless
of their productivity rates.
I call this reward structure Proportional Credit, and I will show that it incentivizes
sharing in a wide range of cases.
Assumption 3.1 (Proportional Credit). The productivity parameters and the credit
rewards stand in the following relation: for every scientist i and for any pair of stages
j < j′,
cjλij ≥ cj′λij′ .
The name of this assumption refers to the special case where the two sides of
the above expression are equal: in this case credit is given for each stage exactly in
proportion to its difficulty. This is arguably the most interesting case, but as I will
show the incentive to share exists not only in this special case, but also whenever
earlier stages are worth relatively more credit.
If Proportional Credit is satisfied, the backwards induction solution of Gp2,2 is
for both scientists to play E at both of their decision nodes. Like any backwards
induction solution, this is an equilibrium.
This Game has other equilibria. If both scientists play strategy E if they are the
first to solve stage 1 then the bottom decision nodes in figure 3.1 are never reached.
If one or both scientists play strategy H or a mixed strategy at their bottom decision
node the resulting assignment of strategies may still be an equilibrium. But these
equilibria are behaviorally indistinguishable from the one identified by backwards
induction: they differ only in that some scientists make different choices at decision
nodes that will not actually be reached in the Game.
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It can be shown that a similar analysis goes through when the number of scientists
or the number of stages is changed, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Let n ≥ 2, k ≥ 1 and assume Proportional Credit.
(a) Gpn,k has a (unique) backwards induction solution in which all scientists play
strategy E at every decision node.
(b) Gpn,k has no equilibria (in pure or mixed strategies) that are behaviorally distinct
from the backwards induction solution.
Part (b) of this theorem is a consequence of theorem A.4, which is proved in
appendix A. Part (a) requires a separate proof, which is given in appendix B.
4 The Intermediate Results Game with Imperfect
Information
In this section I analyze a version of the Game in which scientists do not know if
other scientists have any unpublished results. Figure 4.1 shows the extensive form of
the Intermediate Results Game with imperfect information in its simplest form (Gm2,2).
The only difference compared to figure 3.1 is the appearance of the dashed lines
between decision nodes. These indicate so-called information sets: sets of decision
nodes that the scientist who has to make a decision cannot distinguish between (i.e.,
she must play the same strategy at each node in the set).
As a result the number of (pure) strategies is reduced. Previously, a scientist had
four possible strategies: she could play either E or H at either of her decision nodes.
Now each scientist has just one information set, and two possible strategies: E or H.
Table 4.1: Expected Credit in Gm2,2
E H
E
(
c1λ11
σ1
+ c2λ12σ2 ,
c1λ21
σ1
+ c2λ22σ2
) (
c1σ2+c2λ12
σ1σ2/λ11
σ12+λ21
σ12
, Cλ21λ22σ1σ12 +
c2λ11λ22
σ1σ2
σ12+λ21
σ12
)
H
(
Cλ11λ12
σ1σ21
+ c2λ21λ12σ1σ2
σ21+λ11
σ21
, c1σ2+c2λ22σ1σ2/λ21
σ21+λ11
σ21
)(
Cλ11λ12
σ1σ21σ2
(σ2 + σ1+σ2σ12/λ21 ),
Cλ21λ22
σ1σ12σ2
(σ2 + σ1+σ2σ21/λ11 )
)
Note.—Scientist 1’s strategy as the rows, and scientist 2’s strategy as the columns.
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Figure 4.1: Extensive form of Gm2,2.
Table 4.1 gives the expected credit for each scientist as a function of the scientists’
choice of strategy. With some algebra it can be shown that the strategy profile (E,E)
on which both scientists share is an equilibrium if and only if
c1λ11
c2λ12
≥ λ22
σ2
and c1λ21
c2λ22
≥ λ12
σ2
.
These inequalities are identical to those found in section 3 and are those established
by Banerjee et al. (2014, theorem 2.1) as sufficient conditions for a sharing equilibrium.
Moreover, if the above inequalities are strict then the equilibrium is both unique
and strict (an equilibrium is strict if unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium
strictly decreases a scientist’s expected credit). Note that the strict version of both
inequalities is satisfied under Proportional Credit.
In the general version of the Game (with n and k possibly greater than 2) each
scientist has to formulate a strategy (E or H) for each information set. At an
information set, the scientist knows which stage was the last one to be completed
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and shared by some scientist, and how many stages she has since completed herself.
However, she does not know how many stages have been completed but not shared
by other scientists. As a result, the number of possible strategies is smaller than in
the game of perfect information of section 3. It turns out that under Proportional
Credit the general version of the Game also has only one equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1. Let n ≥ 2, k ≥ 1 and assume Proportional Credit.
(a) Gmn,k has an equilibrium in which all scientists play strategy E at every infor-
mation set (this follows from Banerjee et al. 2014, theorem 2.1).
(b) Gmn,k has no other equilibria (in pure or mixed strategies).
(c) The equilibrium is strict.
This theorem is a consequence of theorem A.4, which is proved in appendix A.
5 A Network of Stages
This section relaxes the assumption that the stages can be completed in only one
order. Here I assume instead that the k stages are arranged in a directed acyclic
network with the stages represented as edges. Work on a given stage j can only be
started if all stages (edges) ending at the node at which j begins have been completed.
(Equivalently, stages can be represented as nodes, with each edge indicating that its
beginning node is a prerequisite for starting its ending node.) If g is any such network
describing the order in which k ≥ 1 stages can be completed by n ≥ 2 scientists, then
Gpn,g denotes this more general version of the Intermediate Results Game with perfect
information, and Gmn,g denotes the more general version of the Intermediate Results
Game with imperfect information.
Define rij = cjλij to be the reward rate for scientist i while working on stage j.
The following assumption is a variation of the monotonicity assumption made by
Banerjee et al. (2014, 158).
Assumption 5.1 (Monotonicity). There is a strict ordering of the stages by their
reward rate, this ordering is the same for all scientists, and a given stage’s reward
rate is always lower than any of its prerequisites. Formally,
(a) For any pair of stages j and j′, either rij < rij′ for all scientists i, or rij′ < rij
for all scientists i.
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(b) If completing stage j is required for starting stage j′, then rij′ < rij for all
scientists i.
Monotonicity imposes a natural ordering on the stages. Making use of this fact,
from here on I assume without loss of generality that the stages are relabeled such
that j < j′ if and only if rij′ < rij for all scientists i. Note that, since a stage’s reward
rate is lower than its prerequisites, completing the stages in the order 1, 2, . . . , k is
consistent with the restrictions imposed by the network g.
At any given time in the Game, let Ji denote the stages available for scientist i
to work on (i.e., stages that are unsolved but all prerequisites have been solved by i
or solved and shared by another scientist). Let j∗i denote the available stage that
has the highest reward rate for scientist i. Given Monotonicity and the relabeling
specified above, it follows that j∗i = min Ji.
In general, it need not be the case that the expected duration of the Game is
minimized if all scientists immediately share any intermediate stages they complete
(unlike before). For example, suppose there are two scientists and two stages that
can be completed independently. Suppose that scientist 1 works faster on stage 1
and scientist 2 works faster on stage 2; e.g., λ11 = λ22 = 2 and λ12 = λ21 = 1. Then
expected duration is minimized (at 7/12) if scientist 1 begins by working on stage 1
and scientist 2 begins by working on stage 2 (and both share if they complete it).
But if the reward for completing stage 1 is more than twice the reward for completing
stage 2, the unique equilibrium is for both scientists to begin working on stage 1 (and
share if they complete it), which yields an expected duration of 2/3 > 7/12.
However, Banerjee et al. (2014) show that there is a special case of the Game
in which sharing does minimize expected duration. Say that the separable aptitudes
assumption is satisfied if there are parameters ai (“aptitude”, depending only on the
scientist) and sj (“simplicity”, depending only on the stage) such that for all i and j,
λij = aisj. If separable aptitudes holds, and there exists an equilibrium in which all
scientists immediately share any intermediate stages they complete, then expected
duration is minimized in this equilibrium (Banerjee et al. 2014, theorem 4.3).
My argument for a unique equilibrium in this section requires expected duration
to be minimized. But it does not otherwise depend on Banerjee et al.’s separable
aptitudes assumption. So I simply assume that the profile of interest minimizes
expected duration (with Banerjee et al.’s result guaranteeing that there are at least
some cases where this assumption is satisfied).
Stating the formal version of this assumption requires some notation. Let sEi
denote the strategy in which scientist i works on stage min Ji (i.e., the unshared
stage with the lowest label) at any given time and plays strategy E whenever she
completes a stage. Let SE denote the strategy profile in which every scientist i plays
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strategy sEi .
Let Wj(S) denote the waiting time until some scientist shares the solution to
stage j, assuming strategy profile S is being played. Wj(S) is a random variable
because the time it takes individual scientists to solve stages is random, and it
depends on the strategy profile being played because even if a scientist solves a stage
at time t she may not share it at that time depending on her strategy. It follows that
maxjWj(S) is the duration of the Game (note that, in general, stages may be shared
out of order).
Assumption 5.2 (Minimal Time). The expected completion time is minimized un-
der SE. That is, for all strategy profiles S,
E
(
max
j
Wj(S)
)
≥ E
(
max
j
Wj(SE)
)
.
Under these assumptions, theorems 3.2 and 4.1 can be generalized to the context
of a directed acyclic network describing the order of the stages.
Theorem 5.3. Let n ≥ 2 and let g be a network for k ≥ 1 stages. Assume Mono-
tonicity and Minimal Time.
(a) The strategy profile SE is an equilibrium for Gpn,g and Gmn,g.
(b) In Gpn,g, the equilibrium SE is unique up to deviations off the equilibrium path.
(c) In Gmn,g, the equilibrium SE is unique and strict.
Part (a) of theorem 5.3 is not a completely novel result, as Banerjee et al. (2014,
theorem 3.2) prove this for Gmn,g under slightly different conditions. They do not
require Minimal Time and their statement of the Monotonicity assumption is subtly
different. Roughly speaking though, my result shows that the sharing equilibrium
found by Banerjee et al. is unique whenever the equilibrium minimizes the expected
completion time of the research project.
6 A Boundedly Rational Perspective
In this section I show that the versions of the Intermediate Results Game with
imperfect information (Gmn,k and Gmn,g) are weakly better reply games. This means
that boundedly rational scientists are likely to learn to play the equilibrium strategy,
i.e., will learn to share their intermediate results. I show this in detail for the learning
rule probe and adjust.
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Huttegger (2013) defines the following concepts. Let G be a game. A weakly better
reply path is a sequence of strategy profiles (S1, . . . , S`) for G such that for any j < `,
profile Sj differs from profile Sj+1 only in one scientist’s strategy, say scientist i, and
ui(Sj+1) ≥ ui(Sj), i.e., scientist i changes to a strategy that is a (weakly) better reply
to the other scientists’ strategies. G is a weakly better reply game if there exists a
weakly better reply path from any strategy profile S to a strict equilibrium.
Theorem 6.1. Let n ≥ 2 and let k ≥ 1.
(a) Assuming Proportional Credit, Gmn,k is a weakly better reply game.
(b) Let g be a network for k stages and assume Monotonicity and Minimal Time.
Then Gmn,g is a weakly better reply game.
Proof. The result is a corollary of theorem A.4. The unique and strict equilibrium in
both games is SE. Let S 6= SE be any strategy profile. By theorem A.4 there exists
a scientist i who is not playing the equilibrium strategy in S but for whom switching
to the equilibrium strategy is a better reply. Let S ′ be the strategy profile that differs
from S only in that scientist i has switched to the equilibrium strategy. If S ′ 6= SE
the same reasoning can be applied again. This generates a weakly better reply path
of maximum length n from S to SE.
Now suppose a group of n scientists are repeatedly playing some game G and
adjusting their strategy in light of previous payoffs. A scientist using probe and adjust
follows a simple procedure: on each round, play the same strategy as the round
before with probability 1− ε, or probe a new strategy with some “small” probability
ε > 0. In case of a probe, pick a new strategy uniformly at random from all possible
strategies. After playing this strategy for one round, evaluate the probe: if the payoff
for the probing round is higher than the payoff in the previous round, keep the
probed strategy (at least until the next probe); if the payoff is lower, return to the
old strategy; if payoffs are equal, return to the old strategy with probability q ∈ (0, 1)
and retain the probe with probability 1− q (note that this is not quite the same as
asking whether the probed strategy is a better reply to the other scientists’ strategies,
due to the possibility of simultaneous probes).
Suppose all scientists use probe and adjust to determine their strategy in repeated
plays of a weakly better reply game G. Assume moreover that all scientists use the
same values of ε and q (this assumption can be relaxed, see Huttegger et al. 2014,
837–838). Let St be the profile of strategies played on round t. Then the following
result holds.
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Theorem 6.2 (Huttegger (2013)). For any probability p < 1, if the probe probability
ε > 0 is sufficiently small, then the profile St is a strict equilibrium of G for all
sufficiently large t with probability at least p.
Since Gmn,k and Gmn,g are weakly better reply games by theorem 6.1, theorem 6.2
applies to them. The (unique) strict equilibria of these games have all scientists share
their intermediate results as soon as they complete them. So if, on a given round,
the scientists are playing the equilibrium profile, they may be said to have learned
to share their intermediate results. Theorem 6.2 says that the probability of this
happening can be made arbitrarily high by choosing a small enough probe probability
and a long enough waiting time. Moreover, the theorem says that once the scientists
learn to share their intermediate results they continue to do so on most subsequent
rounds.
Because the equilibrium is both strict and unique, various other learning rules
and evolutionary dynamics will display similar behavior: scientists will learn to share
their intermediate results and continue to do so with high probability. Examples
include fictitious play, the best-response dynamics, and the replicator dynamics.
7 Measuring Credit Per Unit Time
As Boyer-Kassem and Imbert (2015, section 4) have argued, in order to determine
what rational credit-maximizing scientists would do it may be better to assume that
scientists are maximizing expected credit per unit of time (rather than total expected
credit from the project). This is because after scientists finish the present research
project, they presumably start working on a new one with its own expected credit
reward, and hence spending more time on the present project carries an opportunity
cost. This section shows that the results presented so far hold also in a version of the
Intermediate Results Game in which payoff is measured in expected credit per unit
of time.
Let Gptn,k denote the adapted version of the Game with perfect information and
let Gmtn,k denote the adapted version of the Game with imperfect information. These
games have the same strategy spaces as Gpn,k and Gmn,k respectively, differing only in
that the payoff functions measure credit per unit of time. (In this section I restrict
attention to the case where stages can only be completed sequentially.)
Theorem 7.1. Let n ≥ 2, k ≥ 1 and assume Proportional Credit.
(a) Gptn,k has a (unique) backwards induction solution in which all scientists play
strategy E at every decision node.
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(b) Gptn,k has no equilibria (in pure or mixed strategies) that are behaviorally distinct
from the backwards induction solution.
Theorem 7.2. Let n ≥ 2, k ≥ 1 and assume Proportional Credit.
(a) Gmtn,k has an equilibrium in which all scientists play strategy E at every infor-
mation set.
(b) Gmtn,k has no other equilibria (in pure or mixed strategies).
(c) The equilibrium is strict.
Theorems 7.1.b and 7.2 are consequences of theorem A.5, which is proved in
appendix A. Theorem 7.1.a is proved in appendix B.
The same short proof given in section 6 can be used to conclude from theorem A.5
that Gmtn,k is a weakly better reply game. Hence scientists using probe and adjust will
find the sharing equilibrium with high probability by theorem 6.2.
This shows that, when credit is measured per unit of time, there is an incentive
to share in the Intermediate Results Game under the same conditions for which I
showed it to exist in the case where total credit at the end of the Game is the key
quantity.
8 Conclusion
Despite the claims of Strevens (2017) and others it turns out that there is a range
of circumstances under which the sharing of intermediate results is incentivized for
credit-maximizing scientists. In particular, a sufficient condition appears to be that
intermediate results are rewarded with at least as much credit as the results that
depend on them, relative to their difficulty.
Banerjee et al. (2014) had already shown the existence of a sharing equilibrium in
these circumstances. I have shown that this equilibrium is unique, a strong result for
a game-theoretic model. Moreover, I have shown that a similar equilibrium exists
(and is unique up to deviations off the equilibrium path) for a version of the Game
with perfect information and for a version of the Game in which credit is measured
per unit of time. Finally, I have shown that boundedly rational scientists will also
learn to share their intermediate results in these games, because they are weakly
better reply games.
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A A Unique Nash Equilibrium
This appendix proves theorem A.4, which shows that in any strategy profile in which
not all scientists immediately share any intermediate results they complete, some
scientist can improve her expected payoff by switching to a sharing strategy. This
result holds for each version of the Game under slightly different conditions, but as I
will show these conditions make it such that the same proof works in all cases.
For the duration of this section, let n ≥ 2 be the number of scientists, let k ≥ 1 be
the number of stages, and let g be a directed acyclic network with k stages. Consider
the games Gpn,k, G
pt
n,k, Gmn,k and Gmtn,k in which the k stages have to be completed
sequentially and the games Gpn,g and Gpn,g in which g describes the order in which the
k stages can be completed.
As is commonly done in game theory, I use ui(si, s−i) to denote the payoff (expected
units of credit at the end of the game) to scientist i if si gives her strategy and s−i
gives the strategies of all scientists other than i (call this an “incomplete strategy
profile”). I use this notation interchangeably with ui(S), the payoff to scientist i
given a complete strategy profile S.
I will abuse notation somewhat to make the proof work for the different versions
of the Game. For any scientist i, let sEi denote the equilibrium strategy (or rather
the putative equilibrium strategy—part of what I will show is that it is indeed an
equilibrium strategy). So in Gpn,k and G
pt
n,k, sEi is the strategy that plays strategy E
at every decision node; in Gmn,k and Gmtn,k this strategy plays E at every information
set; in Gpn,g this strategy always works on stage min Ji and plays E at every decision
node; and in Gmn,g this strategy always works on stage min Ji and plays E at every
information set.
Let sE−i denote the incomplete strategy profile in which every scientist i′ 6= i plays
strategy sEi′ , and let SE = (sEi , sE−i) be the (putative) equilibrium. The first lemma
gives an explicit formula for scientist i’s payoff in the profile SE. It does not depend
on any specific assumptions.
Lemma A.1. In the games Gpn,k, Gmn,k, Gpn,g, and Gmn,g the payoff to scientist i under
the strategy profile SE is
ui(SE) =
k∑
j=1
rij
σj
.
Proof. Under strategy profile SE, the scientists work on the stages in the order they
are labeled (starting with stage 1, ending with stage k), sharing each result as soon
as they complete it. Under these circumstances, a scientist i can be viewed as a
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nonstationary reward process producing payoff at a rate of rij units of payoff per unit
of time if j is the current stage.
Under SE, the time it takes the scientists to solve and share stage j is exponentially
distributed with parameter σj (cf. section 2). So the expected time spent on stage j
is 1/σj.
The second lemma shows that, if SE minimizes the expected completion time of
the overall research project, it also minimizes the waiting time until the first j stages
have been shared.
Lemma A.2. Let S 6= SE be some arbitrary strategy profile in Gpn,k, Gptn,k, Gmn,k, Gmtn,k,
Gpn,g, or Gmn,g. Depending on the version of the Game, add the following additional
assumptions:
• For Gpn,g and Gmn,g, assume Minimal Time.
• For Gpn,k, Gptn,k, and Gpn,g, assume that S involves a deviation on the equilibrium
path relative to SE.
Then for any j,
E
(
max
j′≤j
Wj′(S)
)
≥ E
(
max
j′≤j
Wj′(SE)
)
=
j∑
j′=1
1
σj′
.
Moreover, there exists a value of j for which the above inequality is strict. In particular,
for Gpn,k, G
pt
n,k, Gmn,k, and Gmtn,k, strict inequality holds for j = k.
Proof. As noted above, under SE the scientists complete and share the stages in the
order they are labeled, and each stage j is expected to take 1/σj, so
E
(
Wj(SE)
)
− E
(
Wj−1(SE)
)
= 1
σj
,
and
E
(
max
j′≤j
Wj′(SE)
)
= E
(
Wj(SE)
)
=
j∑
j′=1
1
σj′
.
This establishes the equality.
To prove the inequality, suppose for reductio that there exists a stage j such that
E
(
max
j′≤j
Wj′(S)
)
< E
(
max
j′≤j
Wj′(SE)
)
.
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Now define the strategy profile S ′ as follows. Under S ′, each scientist i plays strategy s′i,
which is a combination of si (the strategy scientist i plays under S) and sEi , as follows:
s′i =
si at any time until maxj′≤jWj′(S ′),sEi at any time after maxj′≤jWj′(S ′).
Then
E
(
max
j′
Wj′(S ′)
)
= E
(
max
j′≤j
Wj′(S ′)
)
+ E
(
max
j′
Wj′(S ′)−max
j′≤j
Wj′(S ′)
)
= E
(
max
j′≤j
Wj′(S)
)
+
k∑
j′=j+1
1
σj′
<
k∑
j′=1
1
σj′
= E
(
max
j′
Wj′(SE)
)
This contradicts the fact that SE minimizes the expected completion time of the
research project, which is known to be true in the case in which stages are completed
sequentially (cf. Banerjee et al. 2014, 159) and which I have assumed to be true
through Minimal Time in the case of a network of stages. So the inequality holds.
It remains to show that the inequality is strict for some value of j. Here I
distinguish two cases.
1. Under S, all scientists complete the stages in the order they are labeled.
Since S differs from SE (on the equilibrium path), it follows that there is a positive
probability under S that a situation arises in which a scientist i plays strategy H. If
this happens, there is a positive probability that some other scientist finishes and
shares the stage that i failed to share before scientist i completes another stage. This
increases the expected completion time of the overall project (cf. Banerjee et al. 2014,
159), i.e.,
E
(
max
j′≤k
Wj′(S)
)
> E
(
max
j′≤k
Wj′(SE)
)
.
In the games Gpn,k, G
pt
n,k, Gmn,k, and Gmtn,k, the stages can only be completed in one order.
So for these games strict inequality holds in particular for the expected completion
time of the overall project.
2. Under S, at least one scientist does not complete the stages in the order they
are labeled.
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Let j be the lowest stage number such that at least one scientist does not start
working on stage j as soon as she knows the solution to stages 1, . . . , j − 1. From the
inequality established above,
E
(
max
j′≤j−1
Wj′(S)
)
≥ E
(
max
j′≤j−1
Wj′(SE)
)
=
j−1∑
j′=1
1
σj′
.
Since not every scientist immediately starts working on stage j, the expected time
until stage j is shared must be strictly greater than 1/σj. So
E
(
max
j′≤j
Wj′(S)
)
>
j−1∑
j′=1
1
σj′
+ 1
σj
= E
(
max
j′≤j
Wj′(SE)
)
.
Note that the preceding lemmas do not require Proportional Credit or Monotonic-
ity; they are true for all (positive) productivity rates and for all (positive) credit
rewards. The next lemma shows that when these assumptions are introduced, if
not every scientist plays the (putative) equilibrium strategy, scientists who do get a
higher payoff than they do in lemma A.1.
Lemma A.3. Let i be a scientist in Gpn,k, Gmn,k, Gpn,g, or Gmn,g, and assume scientist i
plays strategy sEi . Let s−i denote an incomplete strategy profile such that S =
(sEi , s−i) 6= SE. Depending on the version of the Game, add the following additional
assumptions:
• For Gpn,g and Gmn,g, assume Monotonicity and Minimal Time.
• For Gpn,k and Gmn,k, assume Proportional Credit.
• For Gpn,k and Gpn,g, assume that S involves a deviation on the equilibrium path
relative to SE.
Then ui(S) > ui(SE).
Proof. Just like in the proof of lemma A.1, it is useful to view scientist i as a
nonstationary reward process. When she is working on stage j, she produces payoff at
a rate of rij units of payoff per unit of time. By Proportional Credit or Monotonicity,
this rate is non-increasing throughout the Game for scientist i.
So scientist i expects to get a payoff of rik > 0 per unit of time throughout the
Game, which has an expected duration of E(maxj′Wj′(S)). Moreover, she expects to
get an additional rik−1 − rik per unit of time as long as stage k− 1 remains unshared,
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which is expected to take E(maxj′≤k−1Wj′(S)) time units. And so on. Hence (setting
rik+1 = 0 for notational convenience)
ui(S) =
k∑
j=1
(rij − rij+1)E
(
max
j′≤j
Wj′(S)
)
.
Lemma A.2 says that E(maxj′≤jWj′(S)) ≥ ∑jj′=1 1/σj′ , with strict inequality for
some value of j. In the case of Gpn,g and Gmn,g, since rij − rij+1 > 0 for all j by
Monotonicity, plugging this in yields
ui(S) >
k∑
j=1
(rij − rij+1)
j∑
j′=1
1
σj′
.
In the case of Gpn,k and Gmn,k, the above inequality also holds due to the following
facts: rij − rij+1 ≥ 0 by Proportional Credit, E(maxj′≤kWj′(S)) > ∑kj′=1 1/σj′ by
lemma A.2, and rik > 0.
Interchanging the sums then gives the desired result:
ui (S) >
k∑
j′=1
k∑
j=j′
(rij − rij+1) 1
σj′
=
k∑
j′=1
rij′
σj′
= ui(SE).
The main result follows from lemma A.3. It shows that any strategy profile that
differs from SE (on the equilibrium path) is not an equilibrium.
Theorem A.4. Let S 6= SE be some arbitrary strategy profile in Gpn,k, Gmn,k, Gpn,g,
or Gmn,g. Depending on the version of the Game, add the following additional assump-
tions:
• For Gpn,g and Gmn,g, assume Monotonicity and Minimal Time.
• For Gpn,k and Gmn,k, assume Proportional Credit.
• For Gpn,k and Gpn,g, assume that S involves a deviation on the equilibrium path
relative to SE.
Then there exists at least one scientist i playing strategy si 6= sEi such that she would
be strictly better off playing strategy sEi :
ui
(
sEi , s−i
)
> ui (si, s−i) .
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Proof. Recall that the Intermediate Results Game is zero-sum (if payoff is measured
in total credit): regardless of strategies, there are C units of credit to be divided, and
so if one scientist’s payoff increases, another’s decreases. Combined with lemmas A.1
and A.3 this yields the theorem. Distinguish three cases:
1. There is only one scientist i playing a (pure or mixed) strategy si 6= sEi .
In this case every scientist i′ other than scientist i is playing strategy sEi′ and so by by
lemma A.3 is getting a payoff greater than ui′(SE). Because the Game is zero-sum, it
follows that ui(si, s−i) < ui(SE). By lemma A.1, ui(sEi , s−i) = ui(SE), and the result
follows.
2. There is at least one scientist i′ playing strategy sEi′ and at least two scientists
playing some other strategy.
In this case any scientist i′ who is playing strategy sEi′ is getting a payoff greater than
ui′(SE) by lemma A.3. Because the Game is zero-sum, at least one of the remaining
scientists, say scientist i, must be getting a payoff less than ui(SE). But if scientist i
changed her strategy to sEi , by lemma A.3 she would get a payoff ui(sEi , s−i) > ui(SE),
establishing the result.
3. Every scientist i′ is playing some strategy si′ 6= sEi′ .
Because the Game is zero-sum, it is impossible for every scientist i′ to be getting a
greater payoff than ui′(SE). So there is at least one scientist, say scientist i, such that
ui(si, s−i) ≤ ui(SE). By lemma A.3, ui(sEi , s−i) > ui(SE), and the result follows.
Theorem A.4 may be used to prove theorems 3.2.b, 4.1, and 5.3.
Proof of theorem 3.2.b. Let S be any strategy profile for the game Gpn,k. If S differs
from SE on the equilibrium path (with positive probability, in the case of mixed
strategies), then at least one scientist has an incentive to change her strategy by
theorem A.4, and so S is not an equilibrium.
Proof of theorem 4.1. Let S be any strategy profile (of pure or mixed strategies) for
the game Gmn,k. If S 6= SE, then at least one scientist has an incentive to change her
strategy by theorem A.4, and so S is not an equilibrium.
That SE is a strict equilibrium also follows from theorem A.4 by considering the
special case where s−i = sE−i. This shows that a scientist i who deviates unilaterally
makes herself strictly worse off.
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Proof of theorem 5.3. Consider first the case of imperfect information. Let S be any
profile for the game Gmn,g. If S 6= SE, then at least one scientist has an incentive to
change her strategy by theorem A.4, and so S is not an equilibrium. That SE is a
strict equilibrium also follows from theorem A.4 by considering the special case where
s−i = sE−i.
In the case of perfect information, any profile which contains deviations from the
equilibrium path is not an equilibrium by theorem A.4, as at least one scientist has
an incentive to change her strategy. On any profile that differs from SE only off the
equilibrium path all scientists get the same payoff as on SE. It follows that SE is an
equilibrium of Gpn,g and any other equilibria differ from SE only off the equilibrium
path.
To conclude this appendix, I show that theorem A.4 extends to the case in which
credit is measured per unit of time. This yields proofs of theorems 7.1.b and 7.2
analogous to the proofs of theorems 3.2.b and 4.1 given above.
Theorem A.5. Let S 6= SE be some arbitrary strategy profile in Gptn,k or Gmtn,k, and
assume Proportional Credit. In the case of Gptn,k, add the further assumption that S
involves deviations on the equilibrium path. Then there exists at least one scientist i
playing strategy si 6= sEi such that she would be strictly better off playing strategy sEi :
ui
(
sEi , s−i
)
> ui (si, s−i) .
Proof. As before, view the scientists as nonstationary reward processes with a reward
rate (expected credit per unit of time) depending on the stage they are working
on and their choice of strategy. As a result, their expected credit per unit of time
from the Game is a weighted average of their reward rate at any given time with the
weights being the expected time spent working at that reward rate. Hence the sum of
the weights (the denominator of the weighted average) is the expected duration of the
Game. It follows that the scientists’ expected payoff (average credit per unit of time
throughout the Game) is equal to their expected total credit divided by the expected
duration of the Game (this is a consequence of the Poisson model of productivity; in
general expectation does not distribute over quotients).
By theorem A.4 there exists a scientist i whose total expected credit from the
Game is higher under strategy profile (sEi , s−i) than under (si, s−i). But (by reasoning
similar to that given in the proof of lemma A.2) it is also clear that the expected
duration of the Game can only decrease if scientist i switches to strategy sEi , i.e.,
E
(
max
j
Wj(sEi , s−i)
)
≤ E
(
max
j
Wj(si, s−i)
)
.
24
But then it follows immediately that scientist i’s expected credit per unit of time
must also be higher under (sEi , s−i):
ui
(
sEi , s−i
)
> ui (si, s−i) .
B The Backwards Induction Solution
Let Gpn,k be the Intermediate Results Game with perfect information, as described in
section 3. This appendix proves theorem 3.2.a, which says that under Proportional
Credit, the Game has a unique backwards induction solution in which all scientists
play strategy E at every decision node. At the end of the appendix I indicate briefly
how the proof given here can be used to show that the same backwards induction
solution holds for Gptn,k (the version of the Game in which the scientists aim to
maximize credit per unit of time).
Begin by fixing a decision node. Let i∗ be the scientist making a decision at this
decision node, having just completed stage j∗ < k. Let j′ < j∗ denote the highest
stage number whose solution has been shared (j′ = 0 if no stages have been shared
yet). For i 6= i∗, let ji denote the stage that scientist i is working on at the time
scientist i∗ completes stage j∗ (so j′ < ji ≤ k).
To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that it is rational for scientist i∗ to play
strategy E at this decision node, assuming that every scientist (including herself) plays
strategy E at all remaining decision nodes. I write E(ui∗(E)) for the expected payoff
to scientist i∗ if she plays strategy E at the present decision node, and E(ui∗(H)) if
she plays H.
Let ai∗ denote the credit scientist i∗ has accumulated before the present decision
node. Let PrE(Rj) denote the probability that scientist i∗ eventually claims credit
for stage j > j′, assuming she plays strategy E at the present decision node. For
convenience write λi∗ for λi∗j∗+1, the productivity rate of scientist i∗ working on stage
j∗ + 1. Let
σE = λi∗ +
∑
i:ji≤j∗
λij∗+1 +
∑
i:ji≥j∗+1
λiji
denote the total productivity of the scientists immediately after the present decision
node, if scientist i∗ chooses to play strategy E. Note that PrE(Rj) = 1 if j < j∗ + 1
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and PrE(Rj∗+1) = λi∗/σE. So
E (ui∗(E)) = ai∗ +
k∑
j=j′+1
cj PrE(Rj)
= ai∗ +
j∗∑
j=j′+1
cj + cj∗+1
λi∗
σE
+
k∑
j=j∗+2
cj PrE(Rj).
Similarly, let PrH(Rj) denote the probability that scientist i∗ eventually claims credit
for stage j > j′, assuming she plays strategy H at the present decision node. So
E (ui∗(H)) = ai∗ +
k∑
j=j′+1
cj PrH(Rj).
Two lemmas provide the crucial inequalities to complete the proof.
Lemma B.1. PrH(Rj) ≤ PrE(Rj) for any j > j∗ + 1.
Proof. Divide the scientists into two groups: let S+ = {i | ji ≥ j} be those scientists
already working on stage j or higher at the time of the present decision node and let
S− = {i | ji < j} be those working on stage j − 1 or lower, including i∗. Let A be
the event that a scientist in S+ claims credit for stage j and let A¯ be the event that
a scientist in S− claims credit for stage j. I make two claims.
First,
PrH(Rj | A¯) = PrE(Rj | A¯) = λi∗j/
∑
i∈S−
λij.
This is because, due to the backwards induction assumption, if a scientist in S−
completes stage j− 1 she shares the solution, and so all scientists in S− start working
on stage j at the same time.
Second, PrH(A) ≥ PrE(A). This is because choosing strategy H at the present
decision node can only increase the expected time it takes the scientists in S− to get
to start working on stage j, thus improving the probability that one of the scientists
in S+ completes whatever stage she is working on before that happens.
From these two claims it follows that
PrH(Rj) = PrH(Rj | A¯) PrH(A¯) ≤ PrE(Rj | A¯) PrE(A¯) = PrE(Rj).
Lemma B.2.
j∗+1∑
j=j′+1
cj PrH(Rj) <
j∗∑
j=j′+1
cj + cj∗+1
λi∗
σE
.
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Proof. The left-hand side indicates the share of the credit from stages j′ + 1 through
j∗+1 that scientist i∗ expects to receive if she plays strategy H at the present decision
node. Since there is a total of ∑j∗+1j=j′+1 cj units of credit to be divided, scientist i∗’s
share can be no higher than that total, minus any portions the other scientists expect
to receive.
Let i be a scientist working on stage ji ≤ j∗ at the time of the present decision
node. From that time until the time stage j∗ + 1 is shared, she can be viewed as
a nonstationary reward process (cf. lemma A.1) producing payoff at a rate of cjλij
units of payoff per unit of time, where j ∈ {ji, ji + 1, . . . , j∗ + 1}. It follows from
Proportional Credit that her expected credit per unit of time is at least cj∗+1λij∗+1
during this time.
If scientist i∗ had chosen strategy E at the present decision node, the expected
time until stage j∗ + 1 is shared would be 1/σE. But since scientist i∗ has chosen
strategy H, scientist i and other scientists like her have to finish stages ji through
j∗ first. So the expected time until stage j∗ + 1 is shared is greater than 1/σE.
Hence scientist i’s expected credit until stage j∗ + 1 is shared is strictly greater than
cj∗+1λij∗+1/σE.
Now let i be a scientist working on stage ji ≥ j∗ + 1 at the time of the present
decision node. If scientist i∗ chooses strategy H this means that credit for (at
minimum) stage j∗ and j∗ + 1 remains unclaimed. The probability that scientist i
claims credit for stage j∗ + 1 is at least λiji/σE (this is the probability that she
completes a stage before anyone else assuming all scientists immediately learn the
solution to stage j∗; in reality her chance of claiming stage j∗ + 1 may be higher
because some scientists need to finish stage j∗ first). Moreover she has some positive
probability of claiming credit for stage j∗. So scientist i’s expected credit from stages
j′ + 1 through j∗ + 1 is strictly greater than cj∗+1λiji/σE.
Putting this all together yields
j∗+1∑
j=j′+1
cj PrH(Rj) <
j∗+1∑
j=j′+1
cj −
∑
i:ji≤j∗
cj∗+1
λij∗+1
σE
− ∑
i:ji≥j∗+1
cj∗+1
λiji
σE
=
j∗∑
j=j′+1
cj + cj∗+1
1− ∑
i:ji≤j∗
λij∗+1
σE
− ∑
i:ji≥j∗+1
λiji
σE

=
j∗∑
j=j′+1
cj + cj∗+1
λi∗
σE
,
where the inequality is strict because at least one of the sets {i : ji ≤ j∗} and
{i : ji ≥ j∗ + 1} is nonempty.
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Now the overall proof can be completed.
Proof of theorem 3.2.a. As noted above,
E (ui∗(H)) = ai∗ +
k∑
j=j′+1
cj PrH(Rj).
From lemma B.1 it follows that
E (ui∗(H)) ≤ ai∗ +
j∗+1∑
j=j′+1
cj PrH(Rj) +
k∑
j=j∗+2
cj PrE(Rj).
Combining this with lemma B.2 yields
E (ui∗(H)) < ai∗ +
j∗∑
j=j′+1
cj + cj∗+1
λi∗
σE
+
k∑
j=j∗+2
cj PrE(Rj)
= E (ui∗(E)) .
This shows that scientist i∗ prefers to play strategy E at the present decision node,
and hence the induction goes through. Because the preference for E over H is strict,
the solution is unique.
Proof of theorem 7.1.a. The average credit per unit of time to scientist i∗ under either
strategy is equal to the total credit scientist i∗ expects to get from the Game divided
by the expected duration of the Game (this holds because scientists are modeled as
Poisson processes, cf. the proof of theorem A.5). By the proof just given scientist i∗’s
expected total credit is higher if she plays strategy E at the present decision node
than if she plays strategy H. The expected duration of the Game is at least as high
when she chooses strategy H as when she chooses strategy E. So scientist i∗’s average
credit per unit of time must also be higher when she chooses strategy E at the present
decision node than when she chooses strategy H.
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